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NOTE
CIVIL RICO: THE PROPRIETY OF CONCURRENT STATE
COURT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
To combat the growing problem of organized crime,' Congress
enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO")2 in 1970. In addition to criminal3 and civil remedies given to
the government, the act creates a private treble-damages cause of action
("civil RICO").4 When it enacted civil RICO, Congress provided for
original subject matter jurisdiction in the United States district courts.5
The lawmakers, however, failed to specify whether this jurisdiction was
exclusive or whether it was concurrent with state courts. 6
Most recently, in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,' the Supreme
Court has provided the framework for determining the effect of congres-
sional failure to specify the nature of district court subject matter juris-
diction.' Federal and state courts, however, remain sharply divided on
the precise question whether RICO establishes exclusive federal subject
matter jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.9
1. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), was enacted as Title IX of the twelve-title Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 18 and 28
U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing for fines of up to
$25,000 and twenty years imprisonment, as well as forfeiture).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1964(c) states: "Any person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
For a discussion of § 1962 violations, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
The cause of action created by § 1964(c) has been called "civil RICO" by most courts
and commentators. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985);
Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) ("Any person injured.., by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court .... "); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 5.
7. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
8. See infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
9. As of this writing, at least twenty-two published opinions have addressed the issue
of whether civil RICO jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988); Brandenburg v. First Mary-
land Sav. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1987); Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Village Improvement Ass'n
v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266
(D. Wyo. 1986); Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Tex. 1986);
Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Carman v. First
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This Note argues that the act should be interpreted to authorize con-
current jurisdiction. Part I discusses civil RICO and its legislative his-
tory. Part II examines Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. " and the
criteria that the court's decision establishes for determining whether sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. Part III explains how
the Gulf Offshore criteria apply to civil RICO. This Note concludes that
when applied to civil RICO, the Gulf Offshore factors do not rebut the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that generally applies when a
statute is silent on the question.
I. CIVIL RICO
Enacted to undermine the economic base of organized crime,1' civil
Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Ky. 1986); Matek v. Murat, 638 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1986), aff'd, No. 86-6292 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP
file); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other grounds,
828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F.
Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration, Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365
(E.D.Wash. 1985); Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985); Levin-
son v. American Accident Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632 (Del. Ch. 1985); Washington
Courte Condominium Assoc.-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 501
N.E.2d 1290 (1986); Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 495 N.E.2d
1132 (1986); Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Acorn, Inc., 207 N.J. Super. 590, 504 A.2d
819 (1985); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip. op. at 1 (N.Y. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 1988); Belfont Sales Corp. v. Gruen Indus. Inc., 112 A.D.2d 96, 491 N.Y.S.2d
652 (1st Dep't 1985); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d
468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st Dep't 1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Construc-
tors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Of these twenty-two cases, fourteen have applied the Gulf Offshore test. Seven of the
fourteen have found jurisdiction to rest exclusively in the federal courts. See Spence, 647
F. Supp. at 1270; Broadway, 643 F. Supp. at 586-87; Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1371; Levin-
son, 503 A.2d at 635; Washington Courte Condominium Assoc.-Four, 150 Ill. App. 3d at
690-91, 501 N.E.2d at 1296; Maplewood Bank & Trust Co., 207 N.J. Super. at 594 n.2,
504 A.2d at 821 n.2; Main Rusk Assocs., 699 S.W.2d at 307.
Seven of the fourteen have found jurisdiction to be concurrent. See Belzberg, 834 F.2d
at 737; Brandenburg, 660 F. Supp. at 732; Contemporary Servs. Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 893
; HMK Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 717; Karel, 635 F. Supp. at 731; Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916,
710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581; Simpson Elec., No. 220, slip op. at 2.
10. 453 U.S. 473 (1981)
11. In enacting RICO Congress stated:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradiction of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organ-
ized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (Statement
of Findings and Purposes).
Characterizing organized crime as a "vulture," Congress considered legislation to pre-
vent the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime as early as 1965. See S.
Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969); 111 Cong. Rec. 4277 (1965). See also
Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No.
5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of Sen.
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO
RICO provides a powerful weapon against individuals who have gained
an unfair competitive or financial advantage over legitimate businesses by
engaging in racketeering activity. 2 RICO's private cause of action au-
thorizes plaintiffs to sue and recover treble damages, costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees from defendants 3 who have engaged in a pattern of racke-
teering activity in violation of the statute.'4
McClellan) (Title IX is designed to prevent organized criminals from infiltrating legiti-
mate commercial enterprises.); 116 Cong. Rec. 35,295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)
(Title IX holds promise of solving the serious problem of infiltration of racketeers into
legitimate business); 116 Cong. Rec. 35,295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poft) (most alarm-
ing aspect of organized crime is its continual infestation into legitimate business). During
the debates preceding RICO's enactment, the following businesses were noted to have
been infiltrated by organized crime: advertising, appliances, basketball, baking, ball-
rooms, cigarette distribution, florists, juke boxes and oil. See Organized Crime Control
Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 76-78 (1969).
For a comprehensive discussion of RICO's legislative history, see Report of the Ad
Hoe Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law 70-126 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Report]; Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action In
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 237, 249-80 (1982);
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal Parts I & II, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 661, 664-
713 (1987).
12. Senator McClellan, in advocating adoption of RICO, described four methods by
which racketeers acquire control of legitimate businesses: "(1) investing concealed profits
acquired from gambling and other illegal activities; (2) accepting business interests in
payment of the owner's gambling debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans and (4) using
various forms of extortion." 115 Cong. Rec. 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan);
see also Organized Crime Control Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals Before Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 409-10 (1970) (testi-
mony of Sen. McClellan); 115 Cong. Rec. 5872-75 (1969) (describing and depicting
structure and activities of organized crime groups). For a discussion of the mechanics of
civil RICO, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Most courts have found that civil RICO does not
authorize equitable relief. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987). Other courts have con-
cluded that private RICO plaintiffs may seek equitable relief. See, e.g., Chambers Dev.
Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (W.D. Pa. 1984). See generally
P. Batista, Civil RICO Practice Manual 169-71 (1987); D. Smith & T. Reed, Civil RICO
10-4 to 10-9 (1987).
14. Section 1964(c)'s private remedy is triggered by a violation of § 1962, which for-
bids four types of conduct: using or investing any income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to establish, operate or acquire an interest in any enterprise engaged
in, or affecting, interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982); acquiring or main-
taining an interest in any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, or the
collection of an unlawful debt, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982), participating or con-
ducting either directly or indirectly the affairs of an enterprise engaged in or affecting,
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt, see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), or conspiring to violate any of these provi-
sions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
An enterprise is defined by § 1961 as "any individual, partnership, corporation, associ-
ation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
Furthermore, according to § 1961, a person engages in racketeering when he commits
any act "chargeable" under several described state laws, any act "indictable" under spe-
cific enumerated federal criminal provisions, including the mail and wire fraud statutes,
1988]
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Civil RICO went largely unnoticed for almost a decade.15 Recently,
however, civil RICO has "stirred a storm of controversy."' 6 Thanks to
broad judicial interpretation of this act, 7 a wide range of plaintiffs now
commonly assert civil RICO claims" in almost any fraud action.19
securities fraud, or drug related activity that is "punishable" under federal law. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Section 1961(5) further requires that at least two of the above offenses or "predicate
acts" must have been committed within a ten year period to constitute a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). Mail and wire fraud are frequently
alleged predicate acts. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (quoting
ABA Report, supra note 11, at 55). The issue of what constitutes a "pattern" of racke-
teering activity has caused a tremendous degree of controversy in the courts. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in order to resolve the disagreement concerning
§ 1961's pattern requirement. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648
(1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). For a discussion of the pattern requirement
problem, see Note, The Civil RICO Pattern Requirement: Continuity and Relationship, A
Fatal Attraction?, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 955 (1988).
15. Although Congress enacted RICO on October 15, 1970, the first reported judicial
opinion encountering the statute did not appear until three years later, and did not even
consider the civil aspects of RICO. See United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying criminal RICO); Lynch, supra note 11, at 695-97 (discussing
early RICO cases). In fact, throughout the 1970s, federal district courts decided only
nine civil RICO cases. See ABA Report, supra note 11, at 55; see also Abrams, Civil
RICO's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 19, 21 (1987)
(arguing that attorneys overlooked RICO in the early years largely because it is codified
in title 18, a title not usually looked to for civil remedies); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced And Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal And Civil Rem-
edies, 53 Temp. L.Q. 1009, 1048 (1980) (offering no explanation).
16. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1984) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting), vacated sub nom. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S.
606 (1985).
More than any other cause of action "enacted by Congress in the past generation, civil
RICO has been plagued by unanticipated consequences." Abrams, supra note 15, at 20.
The Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), while dis-
cussing civil RICO for the first time, acknowledged that "RICO is evolving into some-
thing quite different from the original conception of its enactors." Id. at 500. RICO's
enactors probably did not envision the many problems caused by its draftsmanship. See
Lynch, supra note 11, at 661.
17. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1985) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court has encouraged broad interpretation of the RICO statute by
determining that civil RICO's extensive use against non-racketeer defendants is "inherent
in the statute as written," id. at 499, because Congress included a liberal construction
clause in the RICO statute. See id. at 497-98; accord United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 587-89 & n.l 1 (construing RICO's statement of purpose and legislative history to
require broad reading). See also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
18. By late 1981, plaintiffs began to discover RICO and its "potential breadth."
Abrams, supra note 15, at 22. Since then the number of civil RICO actions filed has risen
sharply: of the 270 pre-1985 district court civil RICO decisions, 3 percent (9 cases) were
decided throughout the 1970s, 2 percent (6 cases) were decided in 1980, 7 percent (19
cases) were decided in 1981, 13 percent (35 cases) were decided in 1982, 33 percent (90
cases) were decided in 1983, and 43 percent (116 cases) were decided in 1984. See ABA
Report, supra note 11, at 55.
19. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (civil RICO has
become a "tool for everyday fraud cases brought against respected and legitimate enter-
prises" instead of being used against mobsters and similar organized crime figures). Mail
and wire fraud constitute predicate acts which can combine to create criminal and civil
['Vol. 57
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In enacting civil RICO, Congress apparently never anticipated the ju-
dicial controversy that would arise over whether federal courts exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO actions.20 Whenever Congress es-
tablishes a new cause of action, it has the option of giving the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction. If Congress does not expressly limit juris-
diction to the federal courts, jurisdiction is presumed to be shared con-
currently between federal and state courts.21 While section 1964(c) of
Title 18 endows the United States district courts with original jurisdic-
tion over civil RICO claims,22 neither section 1964(c) nor any other civil
RICO provision explicitly establishes exclusive federal subject matter ju-
risdiction over civil suits arising under Title IX.2 3 Consequently, courts
disagree about whether jurisdiction rests exclusively in the federal
judiciary.24
Indeed, it is not surprising that Congress overlooked the question of
civil RICO subject matter jurisdiction; the civil RICO cause of action
was not even included in the pending legislation until the lawmakers'
final deliberations.2 ' The legislative history of civil RICO reveals that
nearly all the cursory attention paid to the private civil aspects of the
RICO statute focused on whether to provide a private action at all.2 6
Despite three years of Senate deliberations concerning the RICO statute,
the Senate's final version did not include a private cause of action.2
RICO liability. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Because two predicate acts
are required to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, two fraudulent uses of the
wires or mail would potentially violate RICO. See id. Thus, it is not difficult to allege a
RICO violation against figures other than mobsters. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
20. Congress never even addressed the issue of jurisdiction during its consideration of
civil RICO. See Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Ct.
App. October 25, 1988); see also infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 35-36, 41-44 and accompanying text. The Constitution empowers
Congress to establish the scope of jurisdiction in the lower courts. See U.S. Const. art.
III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be ... in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may... establish."). Congress clearly has the authority to limit jurisdiction
over federal law to the federal courts if it so desires. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479 n.5 (1981); see also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) ("Any person injured... by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court").
23. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see e.g.,
Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988);
Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.
3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 380-82, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579-82 (1985); Simpson Elec.
Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Ct. App. October 25, 1988); see also
Abrams, supra note 15, at 25 n.33.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970).
26. See Karel, 635 F. Supp. at 730; Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 912, 710 P.2d at 379, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 579.
27. The Senate's final version, Senate Bill 30, was similar to the RICO statute as it
was ultimately enacted. See S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 769
(1969); T. Smith & D. Reed, supra note 13, 10.02 at 10-6. Earlier versions of the Senate
1988]
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Consequently, the only civil remedy provided in the Senate version of
RICO was an injunctive remedy now incorporated into section 1964(a),
(b) and (d).28
It was not until the Senate bill was sent to the House and was before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, that Congress incorporated a treble-
damage action similar to the private remedy found in the antitrust laws
into the RICO statute.2 9 The House Judiciary Committee finally in-
cluded a separate cause of action in its legislation because it thought that
the civil remedies available under the antitrust laws were inadequate to
provide a proper remedy to businessmen whose businesses had been de-
stroyed by racketeers.30
When the House Judiciary Committee reported the amended bill to
the House on October 12, 1970, the Committee did not even mention its
addition of the private cause of action.31 The Senate decided to forego a
conference and discussion of the House changes, and simply concurred
with the House version.32 President Nixon signed RICO into law three
bill had "provided for a private treble damages action in exactly the terms ultimately
adopted in § 1964(c)," Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 (1985), but that
provision was "omitted... without explanation." T. Smith & D. Reed supra note 13, %
10.02 at 10-6; see also S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1969); S. 2048 and S. 2049,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Professor Blakey, a principal drafter of the RICO statute,
stated that a private right of action was deliberately omitted from the Senate version in
order to "streamline" the bill and to "sidestep a variety of complex legal issues, as well as
possible political problems," which a private cause of action might raise. Blakey & Get-
tings, supra note 15, at 1017-18 (1980).
28. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1984); see also S. 1623, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) 1969; ABA Report, supra note 11, at 88 n.105 ; Blakey, supra note
11 at 262 n.71; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1017-18 n.46 (1980).
29. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970). The American Bar Associa-
tion, which had called for an amendment "based upon the concept of section 4 of the
Antitrust Act," also supported a private right of action. See id.; Report of the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association on S. 2043 and S. 2049 (1968), reprinted in
Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 559
(1969); H.R. 9327, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 25,190-25,191 (1970).
30. See 115 Cong. Rec. 6993 (1969) (statements of Sen. Hruska). Thus, rather than
simply letting the courts apply existing antitrust provisions against RICO defendants, the
House promulgated a new statute. See id.
It appears that at least some members of Congress had doubts about the language and
scope of the new private cause of action because some members attempted to clarify the
newly created private cause of action in the committee discussions. While in committee,
an amendment establishing penalties for malicious treble damages actions was proposed
but defeated. See 116 Cong. Rec. 35342 (1970). In addition, an amendment to clarify
aspects of § 1964(c) was offered, but later was withdrawn because the entire bill was
"being processed under an informal agreement among Judiciary Committee members to
oppose all floor amendments." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1020 n.67. In light
of the fact that defeat of the amendment was inevitable, it was withdrawn to avoid creat-
ing an unfavorable legislative history. See id.
31. See 116 Cong. Rec. 35,197-35,198 (1970) (remarks of Congressman McCulloch)
(McCulloch indicated that "about fifty changes" were made from the Senate bill but did
not even mention the addition of the private cause of action).
32. The Senate seemingly decided to forego a conference and any discussion of the
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days later.33
II. GULF OFFSHORE Co. V. MOBIL OIL CORP.
In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of congressional silence concerning jurisdiction over civil RICO
claims in general and articulated the analysis that should govern the is-
sue.34 The Supreme Court reiterated the general principle established
over a century ago that state courts possess jurisdiction over cases "aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States"35 un-
less Congress expressly limits this jurisdiction.36 In Gulf Offshore, the
Court also identified criteria to guide lower courts in determining
whether the presumption of shared subject matter jurisdiction is rebutted
in situations in which a statute is silent concerning state court jurisdic-
tion.37 Any effort to resolve the jurisdictional issue in civil RICO, there-
fore, requires application of the Gulf Offshore analysis to the RICO
statute.38
In Gulf Offshore, the question of exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
dealt with personal injury and indemnity cases arising under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA").3 9 Like section 1964(c) of
RICO, OCSLA grants original subject matter jurisdiction to federal dis-
trict courts, but is silent concerning whether state courts also have juris-
diction to hear claims arising under the statute.' The Supreme court
affirmed the lower court's finding of concurrent jurisdiction.
In analyzing OCSLA, the Supreme Court first noted that, in the ab-
House changes because of the approaching end of the 1970 session and the upcoming
elections. See 116 Cong. Rec. 36,280-36,296 (1970).
33. The President had indicated his support for the use of antitrust provisions against
organized crime earlier, so his signature just three days later, on October 15, 1970, was
not surprising. See Special Message to the Congress on a Program to Combat Organized
Crime in America, 1969 Pub. Papers 315, 320-21 (April 23, 1969).
34. 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1980).
35. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
36. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 477-78; California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66-67
(1979); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962); Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 130, 136-37 (1876).
37. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 477-78.
38. See id.; infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
39. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1982 & Supp. III.
1986); see Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478-83, in which plaintiff brought suit against Mobil
Oil Corporation for personal injuries sustained during an attempt to evacuate crewmen
from an offshore drilling platform during a hurricane. See id. at 473. Plaintiff com-
menced his action in Texas state court alleging negligence. See id. at 476. The trial and
appellate courts rejected Gulf Offshore's argument that the state court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the action because the OCSLA vested exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction in the United States district courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision. Id. at 478-84.
40. Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (1982) ("the district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of cases and controversies... arising under this subchapter") with
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) ("[a]ny person injured... may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court .... ).
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sence of express statutory language to the contrary, a strong presumption
exists that jurisdiction over federal claims is shared concurrently by fed-
eral and state courts.4 This presumption is based on the doctrine of
federalism and its influence upon the relationship between the states and
federal government.42 State and federal governments exercise concurrent
sovereignty, although the Constitution limits the states' powers and re-
quires them to recognize federal law as paramount.43 If Congress does
not confer exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts to
hear a particular federal claim, "the state courts stand ready to vindicate
the federal right, subject always to review, of course, in [the Supreme]
Court."'  The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be overcome
only by a strong showing that exclusive jurisdiction is necessary.4"
The Court, however, also acknowledged that the existence of any one
of three factors may rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction:4 6
an explicit statutory directive,47 an unmistakable implication from legis-
lative history," or a clear incompatability between state court jurisdic-
tion and federal interests. 9
The Supreme Court has suggested that the factors enumerated in Gulf
Offshore provide the sole test for resolving a controversy concerning the
existence of exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction."0 Thus, the
Gulf Offshore analysis has been applied to jurisdictional aspects of other
statutes where Congress has failed to specify whether original subject
matter jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent.5 The criteria set forth in
41. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981).
42. See id. at 478 (citing The Federalist No. 82 (Hamilton)).
43. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478. The Constitution establishes the supremacy of
federal law: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . .
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478 n.4 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat.
304, 346-48 (1816)).
45. See id. at 478-79.
46. See id. at 478.
47. See id.; see also infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
48. See id. at 478; see also infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
49. See id. at 478; see infra notes 101-33 and accompanying text.
50. See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 267-69 (1982) (Gulf Offshore standard
applied to Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1923 (1982)); Lane v. Central Bank of Ala-
bama N.A., 756 F.2d 814, 816-17 (11th Cir. 1985) (Gulf Offshore rule applied to Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982)). The statutory language of the Bank
Holding Company Act to which the Eleventh Circuit applied the Gulf Offshore standard
in Lane, 756 F.2d at 817, is similar to the language of civil RICO. Compare 12 U.S.C.
§ 1975 (1982) ("Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in section 1972 of this title may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States... [and] recover three times the amount of damages sustained by him, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.") with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982)
("Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee").
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Gulf Offshore assist in evaluating the need for exclusive jurisdiction,5"
and have been applied in the majority of cases addressing the civil RICO
jurisdiction issue. 3
III. APPLICATION OF THE GULF OFFSHORE FACTORS
Analysis of RICO demonstrates that the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction is not rebutted under the Gulf Offshore test.5 4 First, section
1964(c) contains no explicit statutory directive providing for exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. 5 Moreover, because
Congress never addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction when
enacting RICO, the legislative history supplies no "unmistakable impli-
cation" that Congress intended to prohibit civil RICO litigation in state
forums.5 6 Finally, the arguments suggesting conflicts between federal in-
terests and state court adjudication are insufficient to establish a "clear
incompatability" of interests.5 7
A. Express Statutory Directive
In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction over federal claims
is exclusive or concurrent, Gulf Offshore first directs courts to inquire
whether the statute itself contains an express jurisdictional directive.5
This directive comports with the general principle of statutory construc-
tion that a court, when construing a statute, must look first to the express
statutory language.59 RICO contains no express language about subject
52. See Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 1988); see also Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in
State Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 329-35 (1980) (providing the factors adopted by the
Gulf Offshore court).
53. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Despite the clear applicability of Gulf
Offshore, several courts addressing the issue of jurisdiction for civil RICO have failed to
apply the Gulf Offshore analysis at all, contributing to the confusion that now exists. See
Village Improvement Ass'n v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp. 311, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(concurrent jurisdiction); Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D.
Okla. 1986) (exclusive federal jurisdiction); Carman v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp.
862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (concurrent); Matek v. Murat, 638 F. Supp. 775, 783 n.6
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (concurrent); Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n. 11
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (concurrent); Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712,
718, 495 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (1986) (exclusive federal); Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v.
Acorn, Inc., 207 N.J. Super. 590, 594, 504 A.2d 819, 821 (1985) (same); Belfont Sales
Corp. v. Gruen Indus., 112 A.D.2d 96, 100, 491 N.Y.S.2d 652, 655 (1st Dep't 1985)
(same); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershrnan & Leicher P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 473, 489
N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (1st Dep't 1985) (same). These courts do not provide any reasoning
for their decision not to follow the Gulf Offshore analysis.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-130.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 64-96.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 101-30.
58. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("In determining the
scope of a statute, we look first to its language."); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60
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matter jurisdiction.' Although the statute authorizes suit to be brought
in "any appropriate United States district court,"61 this alone does not
establish exclusive jurisdiction.62 Thus, the statute does not directly re-
but the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 3
B. Indications From Legislative History
The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an "un-
mistakable implication from legislative history" that Congress intended
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims to be exclusively federal."4 An exam-
ination of the legislative history, however, provides no evidence that
Congress ever considered the question of subject matter jurisdiction.6 '
Quite the contrary, while Congress vigorously debated the criminal as-
pects of RICO, it focused little attention on the civil aspects of the stat-
ute.6 Because Congress never addressed the jurisdictional issue, courts
are "not at liberty to amend [civil RICO] . . . to provide for circum-
stances that Congress has overlooked. 67
(1980) (the starting point to ascertain legislative intent is the language of the statute
itself).
60. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1302 (1988); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Cianci v. Supe-
rior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581-82 (1985);
Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Ct. App. October 25,
1988); Abrams, supra note 15, at 25 & n.33.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
62. See Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479 ("It is black letter law.., that the mere
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concur-
rent jurisdiction over the cause of action."); Charles Dowd Box Co. Inc., v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962); United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463,
479 (1936). In the Charles Dowd case, the Court interpreted the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which states in relevant part that "[s]uits may be
brought in any district court of the United States.. ." to grant jurisdiction to the federal
courts, but held that it "does not state nor even suggest that such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive." Id. at 506.
63. Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584, 587 (S.D. Tex. 1986); see
Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988);
Brandenburg v. First Maryland Say. & Loan, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 717, 731 (D. Md. 1987);
Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885, 893 (C.D. Cal.
1987); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other
grounds, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988); Karel v.
Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903,
907-08, 710 P.2d 375, 377-79, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1985).
64. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1302 (1988); Brandenburg v. First Maryland Sav. & Loan, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 717, 731
(D. Md. 1987). Even Professor Blakey, who served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Procedure and who was a principal draftsman and
proponent of RICO, admits that Congress did not consider the issue. See Flaherty, Two
States Lay Claim to Rico, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1984, at 10, col. 2 (quoting Professor
Blakey).
66. See, e.g., Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 730 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Cianci v. Supe-
rior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985); see also supra notes
25-33 and accompanying text.
67. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987); accord Cianci v. Superior
280 [Vol. 57
1988] JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO 281
Despite this evidence, several courts have found an implication of con-
gressional intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO claims in
the federal courts.68 These courts infer congressional intent from the fact
that Congress purposefully modeled section 1964(c)6 9 after section 4 of
the Clayton Act,70 which has been judicially construed to require exclu-
sive federal subject matter jurisdiction.71
Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581-82 (1985). The
Supreme Court has issued a similar caution in another context: "[imn ascertaining the
meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the
theory of the dog that did not bark." Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980)
(analyzing § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. II 1976)). For
a discussion of the effect of judicial interpretation on civil RICO, see generally Blakey,
supra note 11, at 248 n.33 (When construing RICO, courts have "unfortunately and im-
properly read the absence of specific legislative history on a particular point to negate the
general language of the statute.") (emphasis in original); Note, RICO: Are the Courts
Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the Statute Itself?, 55 Notre Dame Law-
yer 777 (1980).
Moreover, Congress has not indicated any interest in clarifying the jurisdiction issue.
In the most recent session, hearings were held on three bills to amend various provisions
of civil RICO. None addressed subject matter jurisdiction. See H.R. 3240, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (introduced Sept. 9, 1987); H.R. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced July
22, 1987); S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced June 23, 1987). For a recent dis-
cussion of the proposed RICO amendments, see Strasser, Prosecutors, Private Bar Find
New Uses for RICO, Natl L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 18.
68. See Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Wyo. 1986); Massey v. City of
Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Levinson v. American Accident
Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del. Ch. 1985); Washington Courte Condominium
Assoc.-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d. 681, 690-91, 501 N.E.2d 1290,
1296-97 (1986); Ambassador Office Equip., Inc. v. Gallagher, Nos. 84-2050, 84-2912 (Ill.
Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ill file); Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v.
Acorn, Inc., 207 N.J. Super. 590, 592-93, 504 A.2d 819, 820-21 (1985); Greenview Trad-
ing Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 470, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504-05
(1st Dep't 1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d
305, 306-07 (Tex. App. 1985).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
70. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982)) (providing private treble damages cause of action for injuries arising out of
antitrust law violations). See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 (1986);
Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (proposing the
addition of a private treble damages action similar to the private damage remedy found in
the antitrust laws); 115 Cong. Rec. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (section 1964(c)
provides another example of the antitrust remedy being adopted for use against organized
crime); id. (remarks of Sen. Hruska) ("[Section 1964(c)] is innovative in the sense that it
vitalizes procedures which have been tried and proven in the antitrust field and applies
them into the organized crime field where they have been seldom used before."); compare
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... )
with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
71. It has long been recognized that § 4 of the Clayton Act grants federal courts
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the statute. See, e.g., Vendo Co. v.
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Although section 1964(c) is generally patterned after section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 72 it does not necessarily follow that Congress must have
intended that the private RICO action also require exclusive federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 73 First, the policies underlying the Clayton Act
differ fundamentally from those of civil RICO.74 The antitrust laws aim
to promote economic competition through market efficiency. 75 In con-
trast, civil RICO addresses the harm suffered by individual businesses as
a result of interference by racketeers.7 6 Its purpose is to "inflict severe
economic injury on violators and perhaps to destroy them.' 77 Because
civil RICO's primary objective is to strip racketeers of their financial
power rather than to achieve market efficiency, 78 civil RICO should pro-
tect the plaintiff injured competitively by a corrupt business, even at the
cost of market efficiency.79
Second, the "mere borrowing of statutory language does not imply
that Congress also intended to incorporate all of the baggage that may be
Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920).
72. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
73. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1302 (1988); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on
other grounds, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988), Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581-82
(1985); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 7, (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 1988). Nor is there any evidence that by adopting the Clayton Act as a model,
"[l]egislators must have known" that § 4 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts,
thereby rendering it "anomalous ... to hold that the jurisdictional grant in the RICO
statute did anything other than create exclusive federal jurisdiction." Belzberg, 834 F.2d
at 736 (quoting County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983),
aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985)).
74. See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S.
922 (1985); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983); Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue
or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 Vand. L.
Rev. 1477, 1513 (1985).
75. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) (antitrust laws reflects a legislative judgment that free competition is "the best
method of allocating resources in a free market"); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (antitrust laws were "designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade").
76. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
77. Abrams, supra note 74, at 1512. For example, contrary to RICO's liberal con-
struction mandate, standing in antitrust cases is strictly restricted to "confine treble dam-
ages to extreme situations and to avoid ruining violators and reducing market place
competition." Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 922
(1985).
78. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
79. See Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 1988); see also Abrams, supra note 74, at 1513; Note, Civil RICO: The Tempta-
tion and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1101, 1113-14 (1982).
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attached to the borrowed language."8 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co."1 rejected the argument that the relation-
ship between section 1964(c) 2 and section 4 of the Clayton Act 3 war-
ranted the application of antitrust standing requirements to section
1964(c). 8 4
Moreover, Congress expressly included a broad purpose clause in
RICO to ensure that the act is "liberally construed to effectuate its reme-
dial purposes."8" The Supreme Court has found that "if Congress' lib-
eral construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964,
where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident."8 6 Therefore, courts
should not frustrate these remedial purposes by compelling a civil RICO
plaintiff to bring his suit in federal court, even though he may prefer a
state forum.
8 7
Even if courts construe the connection between the Clayton Act and
civil RICO as proof that Congress envisioned RICO suits only in federal
courts,88 this argument is insufficient to rebut the presumption of concur-
80. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988).
81. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
84. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99. The Court, in rejecting the lower courts' applica-
tion of the complex and stricter antitrust standing requirements to § 1964(c), stated that
"[iln borrowing its racketeering injury requirement from antitrust standing principles, the
court below created exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid," in rejecting the
strict and complex standing requirements. Id. Moreover, Senator McClellan, a principal
sponsor of the legislation, stated that he had "no intention ... of importing the great
complexity of antitrust law enforcement into civil RICO." 115 Cong. Rec. 9567 (1969)
(comments of Sen. McClellan).
Although Sedima involved standing under civil RICO, rather than jurisdiction, its
holding has been applied to the jurisdiction issue. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d
730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637
F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip
op. at 7 (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1988).
85. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970). For an analysis of the
history and rationale of the liberal construction clause, see Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 167 (1980).
86. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491-92 & n.10 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987) (the liberal construc-
tion requirement "strongly counsels" against reading the obstacle of exclusive jurisdiction
into 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982)) (quoting Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 913,
710 P.2d 375, 379, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1985)), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 1302 (1988);
Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 10-11 (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
1988) (exclusive federal jurisdiction would thwart remedial purposes of the civil RICO
statute).
Indeed, in urging creation of a statute distinct from the Clayton Act, the American Bar
Association stressed that "the use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for combating
organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of per-
sons injured by organized crime." 115 Cong. Rec. 6995 (1969). Such obstacles include
the strict standing and proximate cause requirements that exist in antitrust law. See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
88. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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rent jurisdiction. To rebut this presumption, the party claiming exclusiv-
ity must also produce evidence of an "unmistakable implication" 9 that
Congress intended to prohibit state litigation, not that Congress merely
assumed that the litigation would be exclusively federal.90 In light of the
"clanging silence" 91 surrounding the jurisdiction question, there can be
no implication, much less an "unmistakable implication" 92 of exclusive
jurisdiction. 93
Proponents of exclusive jurisdiction also rely upon Professor Blakey's
suggestion that "courts can infer from the statute that if Congress had
thought about it they would have made jurisdiction exclusive." 94 As the
New York Court of Appeals has aptly pointed out, Professor Blakey's
"after the-fact opinion is insufficent to rebut the presumption of concur-
rent jurisdiction."95 The text of civil RICO and its legislative history
make it clear that Congress did not address the issue.96
C. Clear Incompatability
Even where there is no express statutory directive 97 or clear legislative
intent,98 a showing of "clear incompatability between state court jurisdic-
tion and federal interests" rebuts the presumption of concurrent jurisdic-
tion.99 Factors indicating clear incompatability include "the desirability
of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law,
and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly fed-
eral claims."'"
89. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 945 (1988).
90. See Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
91. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 507 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
92. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 945 (1982).
93. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1302 (1988); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on
other grounds, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988); Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581-82
(1985).
94. Flaherty, supra note 65, at 10, col. 2 (quoting Professor Blakey). In support of his
assertion, Professor Blakey points to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Clayton Act, which
served as a model for § 1964(c). See id. Some courts have relied on Professor Blakey's
comments. See, e.g., Washington Courte Condominium Assoc.-Four v. Washington-Golf
Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690-91, 501 N.E.2d 1290, 1297 (1986); Greenview Trading
Co. v. Herscham & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 472, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 505-06 (Ist
Dep't 1985).
95. Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op.at 7 (N.Y. Ct. App. Octo-
ber 25, 1988); see also Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 914 n.3, 710 P.2d 375,
380 n.3, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 n.3 (1985).
96. See supra notes 25-33, 65-67 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
99. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 945 (1982).
100. Id. at 483-84 (citing Redish & Muench, supra note 52, at 329-35).
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1. Uniform Interpretation
Proponents of exclusive jurisdiction argue that because RICO was en-
acted to attack a national problem-organized crime-and because the
statute establishes a comprehensive criminal enforcement scheme, uni-
formity will be promoted only by exclusive federal jurisdiction. 01 These
arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, although Con-
gress enacted civil RICO to fight the national problem of organized
crime,102 Congressional legislation usually combats national problems
and state court jurisdiction is not necessarily incompatible with this
goal.103 If the mere "national character of a problem necessarily re-
quired uniformity, there could never be a presumption of concurrent ju-
risdiction." 1°4 In most instances, the very character of the statute would
suffice to rebut the presumption.10 5
Furthermore, decisions calling for uniform interpretation erroneously
assert that this goal can only be achieved by exclusive jurisdiction be-
cause several acts that are predicate offenses for RICO purposes are also
violations of federal law. 106 These decisions fail to note, however, that
the predicate offenses set forth in section 1961107 also include violations
of state criminal laws, thereby incorporating both federal and state law
into RICO.' 0
In addition, while Congress provided for exclusively federal subject
101. See, e.g, Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp 1266, 1270 (D. Wyo. 1986) ; Levinson v.
American Accident Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del. Ch. 1985); see also supra
notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of RICO and its enforcement
scheme).
102. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
103. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
1302 (1988); Matek v. Murat, 638 F. Supp. 775, 783 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 915, 710 P.2d 375, 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (1985).
For example, the Securities Act of 1933 establishes a comprehensive enforcement
scheme and nevertheless grants concurrent jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982)
("The district courts of the United States... shall have jurisdiction ... concurrent with
State ... courts .... ).
104. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 915, 710 P.2d 375, 381, 221 Cal. Rptr.
575, 581 (1985).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Wyo. 1986); Broadway v. San
Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration,
Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Levinson v. American Accident Reins.
Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del. Ch. 1985).
107. Section 1961 defines the predicate offenses as including:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, ... narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law..., (B) any act which is indictable
under any of the following provisions of Title 18, United States Code: Section
201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472 and 473 (relating to counterfeiting) . . . section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud) . . ., section 1343 (relating to wire fraud).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A-B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
108. See id.; Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 735-39 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1302 (1988); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 914-16, 710 P.2d 375, 380-82,
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matter jurisdiction over criminal RICO,109 this does not dictate that civil
RICO actions be brought in federal courts as well. 110 Separate jurisdic-
tional grants for civil and criminal provisions are not uncommon. "' For
example, five of the six New Deal federal securities acts authorize private
civil actions and provide for concurrent jurisdiction. 12 The criminal
statute, however, grants exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts."13
Finally, several courts' 14 have expressed concern that concurrent state
court adjudication of civil RICO claims would exacerbate the pervasive
disagreement among federal courts over the proper application and inter-
pretation of the Act.' This fear is unfounded." 6 To the contrary, ex-
panding the number of potential forums may assist in resolving some of
221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580-81 (1985); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip
op. at 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1988).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982), which provides that "[t]he district courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all
offenses against the laws of the United States."
110. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, there is "no reason to read the
federalized aspects of the statute into section 1964(c)." Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730,
738 (9th Cir. 1987) (referring to criminal enforcement of RICO by federal officials), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988); see also Brandenburg v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, 660 F.
Supp. 717, 733 (D. Md. 1987) (Sedima has made it clear that civil RICO is not to be tied
closely to the criminal prosecutions); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 915, 710
P.2d 375, 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (1985) (existence of federal criminal enforcement
scheme does not mandate exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil actions).
111. See Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for
Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 707, 710 (1982).
112. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1982); Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1982); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982);
Investment Co. Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1982); Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
114. See Washington Courte Condominium Assoc.-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp.,
150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 690-91, 501 N.E.2d 1290, 1297 (1986); Greenview Trading Co. v.
Hersham & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 472-73, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (1st Dep't
1985).
115. Civil RICO has spawned a wide variety of inconsistent interpretations concerning
several aspects of the statute. See, e.g.,, Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36,
38-39 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing disagreement regarding pattern requirement); Wilcox v.
First Interstate Bank, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing controversy
concerning appropriate standard of proof for civil RICO claims); Cullen v. Margiotta,
811 F.2d 698, 725 (2d Cir.) (discussing disagreement concerning time of accrual of civil
RICO claims), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804
F.2d 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing disagreement concerning whether a RICO en-
terprise may also be a defendant for the purposes of civil RICO claim), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 698 (1988); Religious Technology Center v. Wallersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081-89
(9th Cir. 1986) (discussing disagreement concerning availability of injunctive relief under
civil RICO), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647
(8th Cir.) (discussing disagreement concerning enterprise/pattern distinction), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
116. The Supreme Court explicitly cautioned that "[t]he fears and doubts of the oppo-
sition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation." Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951)).
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the current disagreement because the increased number of forums would
provide a better basis for "considering all sides of an unresolved ques-
tion."'1 17 In any event, the alleged need for uniformity is not sufficiently
strong to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.118
2. Expertise of Federal Judges in Federal Law
Proponents of exclusive jurisdiction have claimed that federal judges
possess expertise over civil RICO claims superior to that of state
judges."1 While federal judges may possess greater expertise in adjudi-
cating federal claims in general, this is not necessarily true in the case of
civil RICO. 2° Many states have enacted "little RICO" statutes that are
modeled after federal RICO.1 21 Moreover, a significant number of fed-
117. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation,
22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 675-77 (1966); Hazen, supra note 111, at 718; see also Lou
v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Providing a private plaintiff with a
choice of fora encourage[s] enforcement of RICO and preserves an appropriate role for
state courts in cases involving essentially state law."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
For example, after the California Supreme Court in Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.
3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985), found jurisdiction to be concurrent, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted its reasoning and thus ended the disagreement
that had previously existed among its district courts. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730,
737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
118. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1302 (1988); Brandenberg v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717, 731 (1987); HMK
Corp., v. Walsey, 637 F.Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1071
(4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.3d
903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985); Simpson Elec. Corp., v. Leucadia, Inc., No.
220, slip op. at 13-14 (N.Y. Ct. App. October 25, 1988).
119. See, e.g., Levinson v. American Accident Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del.
Ch. 1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305, 306-
07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
120. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988). Indeed, the confusion that currently exists in many areas of civil RICO adjudica-
tion belies any claim of expertise. See Simpson Elec. Corp., No. 220, slip op. at 13-14; see
also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
Some courts have even stated that state court adjudication of civil RICO claims will
not involve state courts in complex questions of federal law interpretation because in
adjudicating a RICO case, courts only need to ascertain whether the alleged predicate
offenses occurred. See, e.g., Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738; HMK Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 717.
The argument is simplistic, however, in light of the recent disagreement existing, for
example, among federal courts as to what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). See supra note 14. While the RICO
statute is admittedly complex, this Note argues that because state court judges are pre-
sumably as intellectually able as federal judges, the complexity of the statute should not
preclude state court judges from hearing these actions. See Simpson Elec. Corp., No. 220,
slip op. at 14; see also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
121. These statutes vary in scope and application, but almost all create private causes
of action. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2301 to 13-2317 (1978 & Supp. 1987)
(treble damages); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (1986) (treble damages and
injunctive relief); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1501-11 (Michie Supp. 1987) (treble and
punitive damages); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-14-1 to 16-14-15 (1988) (treble and punitive
damages); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-45-6-1 to 35-45-6-2, 34-4-30.5-1 to 34-4-30.5-5 (Burns
1983 & Supp. 1987) (treble damages); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-1 to 75D-14 (Michie 1986)
(treble damages). See generally Abrams, supra note 15, at 24 n.29; Granelli, Playing For
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eral civil RICO claims are based on asserted violations of state law, such
as state fraud claims.122 Therefore, since state court judges presumably
are at least as expert in adjudicating state law claims as their federal
counterparts, no need arises for exclusive federal jurisdiction over these
state law claims.12 Furthermore,. in assessing whether state court juris-
diction is compatible with federal interests, the Court in Gulf Offshore
explicitly stated that a claim of exclusive jurisdiction is not supported
where the principles governing the underlying claim are "borrowed from
state law,"' 24 as is the case with several of the RICO predicate acts.
3. Greater Hospitality of Federal Courts to Peculiarly Federal Claims
The "assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal
claims"' 25 is a factor in determining whether federal courts exercise ex-
clusive subject matter jurisdiction over an area of federal law. The
Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore has instructed, however, that state
judges are not to be deemed unsympathetic to a claim simply "because it
is labeled federal, rather than state law."I26 Indeed, in civil RICO, much
evidence suggests that federal courts are not particularly hospitable'27 to
Keeps with State RICO, Nat'l L.J., July 5, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Siegel, Arizona Hits Racke-
teers in the Wallet, L.A. Times, May 3, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
122. In finding jurisdiction to be concurrent, Judge Williams of the Eastern District of
Virginia made these observations:
[A]s a practical matter, state courts are unlikely to find themselves... inter-
preting ... the underlying federal statutes. The vast majority of RICO cases
involve garden variety state law fraud, where the plaintiff has simply seized
upon RICO to obtain federal jurisdiction, treble damages, and attorney's fees.
If anything, RICO involves federal courts in the adjudication of state law
claims, rather than the other way around.
HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other grounds,
828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988).
123. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 915, 710 P.2d 375, 381, 221 Cal. Rptr.
575, 581 (1985); Simpson Elec. Corp., v. Leucadia, Inc., No. 220, slip op. at 14 (N.Y. Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 1988); see also Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 624-29 (1981); Hazen, supra note 111, at 732; Rosen-
burg, The Qualities of Justices- Are They Strainable? 44 Tex. L. Rev. 1063, 1066 (1966).
124. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 945 (1982). Although not totally borrowed from state law as were the OSCLA
claims in Gulf Offshore, civil RICO claims often involve application of state common law
principles over which state court judges are deemed to possess superior expertise. For
example, § 1961 defines the predicate offenses as including: "(A) any act or threat involv-
ing murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter,... narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law ......
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(a-e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added); see also, HMK
Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986) (Because the majority of civil
RICO claims involve state fraud, "RICO involves federal courts in the adjudication of
state law claims, rather than the other way around."), aff'd on other grounds, 828 F.2d
1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988).
125. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 945 (1982).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Sutcliffe v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We...
regret the burdens that the [civil RICO statute] has cast on the federal courts . . .");
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the ever growing number of civil RICO claims that clog their dockets
and further strain limited judicial resources. 128 Consequently, it is not
surprising that the majority of courts that find jurisdiction to be concur-
rent are federal courts. 129 Thus, because no evidence exists to support a
claim of greater hospitality on the part of federal courts to civil RICO
actions, efficient adjudication of the growing number of such actions
should weigh heavily against a hasty, unsupported recommendation of
exclusivity. 130
CONCLUSION
Congress did not address the issue of whether civil RICO subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. In light of this congressional
silence, courts should not read exclusivity into the statute to provide for
circumstances Congress has overlooked. Concurrent jurisdiction com-
ports with the language of the civil RICO statute, its legislative history
and substantive goals. Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction is consistent
with Congress' express mandate that civil RICO be construed liberally.
Catherine M. DiDomenico
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (RICO is a "dramatically
expansive and perhaps insufficiently discriminate, tool for combating organized crime."),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Rojas v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 613 F. Supp. 968, 969
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (referring to civil RICO cause of action as "the now obligatory civil
RICO claim"); Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1984)
(accepting a narrow reading of civil RICO because it reflected an attempt to "slow the
growing burden which civil RICO cases have placed on federal court dockets already
laden with backlogs of cases"). Seemingly motivated by the desire to reduce their over-
flowing dockets, most of the courts finding exclusive federal court subject matter jurisdic-
tion are state courts. See Village Improvement. Ass'n v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp.
311, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Interestingly, it seems that state courts have been more prone
than federal courts to conclude that RICO vests jurisdiction ... exclusively in the federal
courts."); see also supra note 9.
128. Furthermore, it is clear that the number of civil RICO suits being brought is
multiplying rapidly. See supra note 18; Batista, supra note 13, at 4 ("[A]ny review of the
printed advance sheets of federal district and appellate court decisions reveals that the
pace of RICO litigation is intensifying, not diminishing.").
129. See supra note 9.
130. See Brandenburg v. First Md. Say. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717, 730 (D. Md. 1987)
(filing of a burdensome number of claims under the statute weigh in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction); see also Hazen, supra note 111, at 728 ; Redish & Muench, supra note 52, at
334. In fact, the American Law Institute recognized the problem of judicial overcrowd-
ing as far back as 1969 and recommended that all actions be freely removable to state
court when concurrent jurisdiction exists, and generally disfavored exclusive jurisdiction
altogether. See ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts 185-87 (1969). Similarly, concern over crowded federal appellate dockets as early
as the 1970s has led to numerous anti-congestion proposals, including the establishment
of a national or intermediate court of appeals. See Commission on Review of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations For
Change (1975); Federal Judicial Center Report of the Study Group On The Caseload of
the Supreme Court (1972).
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